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Abstract. Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solvers are fundamen-
tal tools in the broad context of software engineering and security re-
search. If SMT solvers are to continue to have an impact, it is impera-
tive we develop efficient and systematic testing methods for them. To this
end, we present a reinforcement learning driven fuzzing system Bandit-
Fuzz that zeroes in on the grammatical constructs of well-formed solver
inputs that are the root cause of performance or correctness issues in
solvers-under-test. To the best of our knowledge, BanditFuzz is the first
machine-learning based fuzzer for SMT solvers.
BanditFuzz takes as input a grammar G describing the well-formed in-
puts to a set of distinct solvers (say, P1 and P2) that implement the
same specification and a fuzzing objective (e.g., maximize the relative
performance difference between P1 and P2), and outputs a ranked list
of grammatical constructs that are likely to maximize performance dif-
ferences between P1 and P2 or are root causes of errors in these solvers.
Typically, mutation fuzzing is implemented as a set of random muta-
tions applied to a given input. By contrast, the key innovation behind
BanditFuzz is the modeling of a grammar-preserving fuzzing mutator
as a reinforcement learning (RL) agent that, via blackbox interactions
with programs-under-test, learns which grammatical constructs are most
likely the cause of an error or performance issue. Using BanditFuzz, we
discovered 1,700 syntactically unique inputs resulting in inconsistent an-
swers across state-of-the-art SMT solvers Z3, CVC4, Colibri, MathSAT,
and Z3str3 over the floating-point and string SMT theories. Further, us-
ing BanditFuzz, we constructed two benchmark suites (with 400 floating-
point and 300 string instances) that expose performance issues in all con-
sidered solvers. We also performed a comparison of BanditFuzz against
random, mutation, and evolutionary fuzzing methods. We observed up
to a 31% improvement in performance fuzzing and up to 81% improve-
ment in the number of bugs found by BanditFuzz relative to these other
methods for the same amount of time provided to all methods.
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1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, many sophisticated program analysis [22], verifica-
tion [26], and bug-finding tools [15] have been developed thanks to powerful
Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solvers. Precisely because solvers have be-
come such critical components, any errors in these solvers call into question
the result produced by analysis tools that use them. Further, the efficiency of
SMT solvers significantly impacts the efficiency of modern program analysis and
verification tools. Given the insatiable demand for error-free and efficient SMT
solvers, these infrastructural tools must be subjected to extensive testing and
analysis. While SMT bit-vector and integer solvers have been subjected to heavy
testing over the years [14], the same cannot be said for many other theories, e.g.,
the theory of quantifier-free floating-point arithmetic (FP).
Fuzzing is a powerful way to test SMT solvers [9]. Fuzzers come in many
forms. Blackbox random fuzzers on unstructured inputs frequently invoke ran-
dom string generation or require a database of input seeds that are mutated via
random or bit-wise procedures [35, 11, 24, 27]. By contrast, mutational fuzzing for
programs that accept highly-structured inputs requires fuzzers to be augmented
with appropriate grammars, in order to enable testing of core functionality be-
yond the parser [41, 27].
Another class of testing methods that has been widely studied is white-
box fuzzing, where a variety of program analysis methods are combined with
fuzzing [21, 27]. However, whitebox testing methods may not scale well for large
complex programs such as SMT solvers. There has been some effort towards
formally verifying SAT solvers [8]. However, we are not aware of any initiative
that scales to verifying large state-of-the-art SMT solvers.
In this paper, we introduce a reinforcement learning (RL) based fuzzer, called
BanditFuzz, that improves on the aforementioned fuzzing approaches by up to a
31% improvement in PAR-2 score margins for relative performance fuzzing, and
up to a 81% increase in bug-revealing inputs. Using BanditFuzz, we generated
a database of 1,600 inputs that expose inconsistencies amongst four bleeding-
edge FP solvers, namely, Z3 [20], CVC4 [4], MathSAT [18], and Colibri [29]. We
also used BanditFuzz to generate a database of 110 instances where two versions
(build and debug) of the Z3 sequence string solver [20] disagree on whether or not
these inputs are satisfiable (SAT). Additionally, we used BanditFuzz to generate
400 inputs that expose relative performance issues across the aforementioned FP
solvers and 300 inputs exposing relative performance issues in the Z3Seq [20],
Z3str3 [6], and CVC4 [4] string solvers.
Description of BanditFuzz: BanditFuzz takes as input a grammar G that
describes well-formed inputs to a set P of programs-under-test (for simplicity,
assume P contains only two programs, a target program T to be fuzzed, and a
reference program R against which the performance or correctness of T is com-
pared), a fuzzing objective (e.g., find bugs or relative performance issues), and
outputs a ranked list of grammatical constructs (e.g., syntactic tokens, expres-
sions, or keywords over the input language described by G) in the descending
order of ones that are most likely to trigger an error or cause performance is-
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sues. BanditFuzz also generates actual instances that expose these issues in the
programs-under-test. (It is assumed that BanditFuzz has blackbox access to
programs in the set P and that all programs in the set P have the same input
grammar G.)
Briefly, BanditFuzz works as follows (for brevity, we only describe the per-
formance fuzzing mode of BanditFuzz here): BanditFuzz generates well-formed
inputs that adhere to G, mutates them in a grammar-preserving manner, and
uses RL methods to learn which grammatical constructs are the most likely to
cause errors or performance issues in the programs in P . Traditional mutation
fuzzers choose or implement a mutation operator at random and are oblivious to
the behavior of the programs-under-test. By contrast, BanditFuzz reduces the
problem of how to optimally mutate an input to an instance of the multi-arm
bandit (MAB) problem, well-known in the RL literature [42, 44]. The crucial
insight behind BanditFuzz is to maintain a list of grammatical constructs in G,
that is ranked based on how likely they are to be the root cause of an error or
performance issue. Initially, all grammatical constructs in G are treated as uni-
formly likely to cause an error by the RL agent. BanditFuzz randomly generates
a well-formed input I to begin with, and runs all the programs in P on the input
I. In each of its subsequent iterations of its feedback loop, BanditFuzz mutates
the input I from its previous iteration using the ranked list of grammatical con-
structs (i.e., the agent performs an action), and runs all solvers in P on the
mutated version of I. It analyzes the results of these runs to provide feedback
(i.e., rewards) to the RL agent in the form which constructs were most likely to
cause relative performance difference between the target program T with respect
to the reference program R. It then updates and re-ranks its list of grammatical
constructs with the goal of maximizing its reward (i.e., maximizing the relative
performance difference between the solvers in P ). The process continues until
the RL agent converges to a ranking and runs out of resources.
Key Features of BanditFuzz: A key feature of BanditFuzz that sets it apart
from other fuzzing and systematic testing approaches is that it isolates or lo-
calizes the root cause (in the form of grammatical constructs of well-formed
inputs) of bugs or performance issue. This form of isolation is particularly useful
to understand problematic behavior in complex programs such as SMT solvers.
Further, the paradigm of reinforcement learning is particularly useful for this
task in the setting of blackbox fuzzing, since RL methods are powerful enough
to navigate a space of inputs in a fashion guided by the feedback they receive
via analysis of the input/output behavior of these complex systems.
Differences between BanditFuzz and Delta Debugging: At first glance,
BanditFuzz’s root cause analysis and error isolation feature may seem similar to
delta debugging [49]. However, there are significant differences between these two
methods. In delta debugging, a bug-revealing input E is given, and the task of a
delta-debugger is to minimize E to get E′, by choosing which part of that input
to keep (and which one to omit), while ensuring that E′ exposes the same error
in the program-under-test as E [32, 31, 2, 49]. In contrast, BanditFuzz has two
modes associated with it. In its performance fuzzing mode, BanditFuzz generates
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many inputs that maximize the performance difference between a target and a
reference solver, and further ranks the grammatical constructs (in descending
order) that are likely the root cause of the lack of performance in the target
solver across all the generated inputs. Additionally, in its bug-localization fuzzing
mode, BanditFuzz generates many bug-revealing inputs for the program-under-
test T , and uses RL to isolate and rank the grammatical constructs that are
most likely the root cause(s) of the errors in T across all the generated inputs.
We are not aware of the use of delta debugging for revealing performance issues
in programs-under-test, nor are we aware of delta debugging tools that construct
a ranking of grammatical constructs that are most likely the root cause of errors
in the program-under-test across many inputs.
Contributions
1. First RL-based Fuzzer for FP and String SMT Solvers: We de-
scribe the design and implementation the first RL-based fuzzer for SMT
solvers, called BanditFuzz. BanditFuzz uses reinforcement learning, specifi-
cally MABs, in order to construct fuzzing mutations over highly structured
inputs with the aim of maximizing a performance or bug-finding fuzzing
objective. To the best of our knowledge, using RL in this way has never
been done before. Furthermore, as far as we know, BanditFuzz is the first
RL-based fuzzer for SMT Solvers.3
2. Empirical Evaluation of BanditFuzz (Fuzzing for Performance): We
provide an extensive empirical evaluation of our fuzzer for detecting relative
performance issues in SMT solvers and compare it to existing techniques.
That is, we use our fuzzer to find instances that expose the large performance
differences in four state-of-the-art FP solvers, namely, Z3, CVC4, MathSat,
and Colibri, as well as three string solvers, namely, Z3str3, Z3 sequence
(Z3Seq), and CVC4 solvers as measured by PAR-2 score [28]. BanditFuzz
outperforms existing fuzzing algorithms (such as random, mutation, and
genetic fuzzing) by up to an 31% increase in PAR-2 score margins, for the
same amount of resources provided to all methods. We also contribute two
large set of inputs discovered by BanditFuzz that contain a combined total
of 400 for the theory of FP and 300 for theory of strings that the SMT
community can use to test their solvers. We are not aware of any other such
tool for performance fuzzing of SMT solvers.
3. Empirical Evaluation of BanditFuzz (Fuzzing to Find Bugs): We
provide an extensive empirical evaluation of our fuzzer for detecting bugs in
SMT solvers and compare with existing fuzzing approaches. We consider four
state-of-the-art FP SMT solvers, namely, Z3, CVC4, MathSat, and Colibri,
as well as, two string SMT solvers, Z3str3 and a debug build of Z3str3.
Using BanditFuzz we found a total of 1,600 bug revealing inputs across FP
solvers and 110 bug revealing inputs between z3str and its debug build. We
3 All our tools and data can be downloaded from the anonymized BanditFuzz website:
https://sites.google.com/view/banditfuzz.
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observe that BanditFuzz improves on existing fuzzing algorithms by up to an
81% increase in total bug revealing inputs, for the same amount of resources
provided to all methods.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Reinforcement Learning
There is a vast literature on reinforcement learning and we refer the reader to
the following excellent surveys and books on the topic [44, 42, 43]. As discussed
in the introduction, the reinforcement learning paradigm is particularly suited
for modelling mutation fuzzing based in an online corrective feedback setting. In
this paper, we specifically deploy multi-armed bandit algorithms [42] (MAB), a
class of reinforcement learning algorithms, to learn mutation operators.
Reinforcement learning algorithms are commonly formulated using Markov
Decision Processes (MDPs) [37, 44, 40]. An MDP is typically specified by a 5-
tuple (S,A, T,R, γ), where S is a set of states, A is a set of actions, T is a matrix
of state action transition probabilities where T [s][a][s′] denotes the probability
of entering state s′ from state s upon taking action a, R is a matrix of rewards
where R[s][a][s′] denotes the reward received for transitioning to s′ from s when
executing action a, and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is a discount factor indicating how rewards
should be scaled down at each time step.
The multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem is a common reinforcement learning
problem based on an MDP with a single state S = {s0} and a finite set of
actions A. Because there is only a single state, T is empty. What remains, is the
unknown probability distribution of rewards R over A. In the context of MAB,
actions are often referred to as arms (or bandits). The term bandit comes from
gambling: the arm of a slot machine is referred to as a one-armed bandit, and
multi-arm bandits referred to several slot machines. The goal of the MAB agent
is to maximize its reward by playing a sequence of actions (e.g., slot machines).
In this paper, we exclusively consider the case where rewards are sampled
from an unknown Bernoulli distribution (rewards are {0, 1}). The MAB agent at-
tempts to approximate the expected value of the Bernoulli distribution of reward
for each an action in A. The MAB learns a policy – a stochastic process of how to
select actions from A. The learned policy balances the exploration/exploitation
trade-off, i.e., a MAB algorithm will select every action an infinite number of
times in the limit, but will select the action(s) with the highest expected reward
more frequently.
We include three solutions to the MAB problem into BanditFuzz. However,
for brevity we will focus on one in this paper, namely, Thompson Sampling.
Thompson Sampling builds a Beta distribution for each action in the action
space. Beta distributions are a variant of Gamma distributions, and have a
long history. We refer the reader to Gupta et al. on Beta and Gamma dis-
tributions [23]. Intuitively, a Beta distribution is a model random distribution
for the expected value of a Bernoulli distribution. It is maintained by parame-
ters α − 1 the samples of 1, and β − 1 the samples of 0, from the underlying
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Bernoulli distribution. Online, the bandit samples each arm’s distribution and
greedily picks its arm based on the maximum sampled value. Upon completing
the action, α is incremented on reward, otherwise β is incremented. For more on
Thompson sampling we refer to Russo et al. [38].
2.2 Satisfiability Modulo Theories and the SMT-LIB Standard
Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solvers are decision procedures for first-
order theories such as integers, bit-vectors, arrays, floating-point, and strings
that are particularly suitable for verification, program analysis, and testing.
We refer the reader to the Handbook of Satisfiability for more details on SMT
solvers [7]. The SMT-LIB is an initiative to standardize the language and specifi-
cation of several theories of interest [5]. In this paper, we will exclusively consider
solvers whose quantifier-free FP and string decision procedures are being actively
developed at the time of writing of this paper.
Quantifier-free Theory of Floating Point Arithmetic (FP) The SMT
theory of FP was first proposed by Rümmer et al. [36] with several recent re-
visions. In this paper, we consider the latest version, by Brain et al. [12]. The
SMT-LIB FP theory supports standard FP sorts of 32, 64, and 128 bit lengths
with their usual mantissa and exponent bit vector lengths, and also allows for ar-
bitrary width sorts with appropriate mantissa and exponent lengths. The theory
includes common predicates, operators, and terms over FP. We refer the reader
to the SMT-LIB standard for details on the syntax and semantics of FP theory.
In this paper, we consider the following set of operators: { fp.abs, fp.neg, fp.add,
fp.mul, fp.sub, fp.div, fp.fma, fp.rem, fp.sqrt, fp.roundToIntegral }, set of pred-
icates: { fp.eq, fp.lt, fp.gt, fp.leq, fp.geq, fp.isNormal, fp.isSubnormal, fp.isZero,
fp.isInfinite, fp.isNaN, fp.isPositive, fp.isNegative }, and rounding terms { RNE,
RNA, RTP, RTN, RTZ }. Semantics of all operands follow the IEEE754 08
standard [19].
Quantifier-free Theory of Strings The SMT-LIB standard for the theory of
strings is in development. We use the current draft version. The draft has a finite
alphabet Σ of characters, string constants and variables that range over Σ∗, inte-
ger constants and variables, as well as the functions { str.++, str.contains, str.at,
str.len, str.indexof, str.replace, re.inter, re.range, re.+, re.*, re.++, str.to re },
and predicates { str.prefixof, str.suffixof, str.in re}. We refer the reader to the
publicly available draft of the SMT-LIB standard for further details on the syn-
tax and semantics of these functions and predicates [16]. We further clarify that
the above lists of predicates, operators, and terms are intentionally incomplete.
The above list was carefully selected to include only those that are supported
amongst all solvers considered in this paper.






















Fig. 1. Architecture of BanditFuzz
2.3 Software Fuzzing
A Fuzzer is a program that automatically generates inputs for a target program-
under-test. Fuzzers may treat the program-under-test as a whitebox or blackbox,
depending on whether they have access to the source code. Fuzzers frequently
implement input generators, which can deploy a model-based or a grammar-based
or generative strategy where all inputs produced conform to the grammar of
the program. Alternatively, fuzzers can implement model-less generators, which
produce random inputs. Mutation fuzzers are a popular alternative to random
fuzzers. Unlike random fuzzers, a mutation fuzzer takes as input a database of
inputs of interest, and produces new inputs by mutating the elements of the
database using a mutation operator (a function defining a syntactic change).
These mutation operators are frequently stochastic bit-wise manipulations in
the case of model-less programs, or grammar-preserving changes for model-based
programs [48, 17, 30, 27]. Other common fuzzing approaches include genetic and
evolutionary fuzzing solutions. These approaches maintain a population of input
seeds that are mutated or combined/crossed-over using a genetic or evolutionary
algorithm [34, 39, 25].
3 BanditFuzz
In this section, we describe our technique, BanditFuzz, a grammar-based muta-
tion fuzzer that uses reinforcement learning (RL) to efficiently isolate grammati-
cal constructs of an input that are likely to be the cause of a bug or performance
issue in the solvers-under-test. The ability of BanditFuzz to isolate those gram-
matical constructs that trigger erroneous behavior or performance issues, in a
blackbox fuzzing manner, is its most interesting feature. The architecture of
BanditFuzz is presented in Figure 1.
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3.1 Description of the BanditFuzz Algorithm
BanditFuzz takes as input a grammar G that describes well-formed inputs to a
set P of solvers-under-test (for simplicity, assume P contains only two programs,
a target program T to be fuzzed, and a reference program R against which the
performance or correctness of T is compared), a fuzzing objective (e.g., find
bugs or relative performance issues), and outputs a ranked list of grammatical
constructs (e.g., syntactic tokens or keywords over G) in the descending order
of ones that are most likely to trigger an error or cause performance issues. We
infer this ranked list by extrapolating from the policy of the RL agent. It is
assumed that BanditFuzz has blackbox access to the set P of solvers-under-test
and their input grammar is G.
The BanditFuzz algorithm works as follows: BanditFuzz generates well-formed
inputs that adhere to G and mutates them in a grammar-preserving manner (the
instance generator and mutator together are referred to as fuzzer in Figure 1),
and deploys an RL agent (specifically an MAB agent) within a feedback loop to
learn which grammatical constructs of G are the most likely culprits that may
cause errors or performance issues in the target program T in P .
BanditFuzz reduces the problem of how to mutate an input to an instance
of the MAB problem. As discussed earlier, in the MAB setting an agent is de-
signed to maximize its rewards by selecting the arms (actions) that give it the
highest expected reward, while maintaining an exploration-exploitation trade-
off. In BanditFuzz, the agent chooses actions (grammatical constructs used by
the fuzzer to mutate an input) that maximize the reward over a period of time
(e.g., maximizing the runtime difference between the target solver T and a refer-
ence solver R). It is important to note that the agent learns an action selection
policy by analyzing the results of its actions over time. Within its iterative feed-
back loop (that enables rewards from the analysis of solver outputs to the RL
agent), BanditFuzz observes and analyzes the effects of the actions it takes on
the solvers-under-test. BanditFuzz maintains a record of these effects over many
iterations, analyzes the historical data collected, and zeroes-in on those gram-
matical constructs that maximize the expected reward. At the end of its run,
BanditFuzz outputs a ranked list of grammatical constructs which are most likely
to trigger an error or cause performance issues, in descending order.
BanditFuzz for Performance Fuzzing: In the fuzzing for relative perfor-
mance fuzzing mode, BanditFuzz performs the above-described analysis to pro-
duce a ranked list of grammatical constructs that maximize the difference in
running time between a target solver T and a reference solver R.
BanditFuzz for Bug Localization: In the fuzzing for bug localization fuzzing
mode, BanditFuzz performs the above-described analysis to produce a ranked list
of grammatical constructs that maximize the likelihood that a target solver T will
disagree with reference solver R. The only difference between the performance
fuzzing algorithm and the bug localization algorithm is in the calculation of
rewards. At a high level, BanditFuzz in bug localization mode, tries to identify
the common features across a set of inconsistency revealing inputs. This is in
contrast to delta-debugging-like techniques that focus on a single input. We
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describe both the performance fuzzing and bug localization modes in greater
detail below.
3.2 Fuzzer: Instance Generator and Grammar-preserving Mutator
BanditFuzz’s fuzzer (See Architecture of BanditFuzz in Figure 1) consists of two
sub-components, namely, an instance 4 generator and a grammar-preserving mu-
tator (or simply, mutator). The instance generator is a program that randomly
samples the space of inputs described by the grammar G. The mutator is a pro-
gram that takes as input a well-formed G-instance and a grammatical construct
δ, and outputs another well-formed G-instance.
Instance Generator: We first describe the generator component of the fuzzer.
Initially, BanditFuzz generates a random well-formed instance. This is done by
the Fuzzer box in Figure 1 using the input grammar G. In this paper, we exclu-
sively consider the input grammar of the FP and string SMT-LIB theories. We
use the random abstract syntax tree (AST) generation procedure for SMT-LIB
theory of strings built into the StringFuzz [9] random fuzzer. We generalize this
procedure for the theory of FP.
To further elaborate on our FP input generation procedure, we first populate
a list of free 64-bit FP variables and then generate random ASTs that are asserted
in the instance. Each AST is rooted by an FP predicate whose children are FP
operators chosen at random. We deploy a recursive process to fill out the tree
until a pre-determined depth limit is reached. Leaf nodes of the AST are filled in
by randomly selecting a free variable or special constant. Rounding modes are
filled in when required by an operator’s signature. The number of variables and
assertions are parameters to the generator and are specified for each experiment.
Similar to the generator in StringFuzz, BanditFuzz’s generation process is
highly configurable. The user can choose the number of free variables, the number
of assertions, the maximum depth of the AST, the set of operators, and rounding
terms. The user can also set weights for specific constructs as a substitute for
the default uniform random selection.
Grammar-preserving Mutator: The second component of the BanditFuzz
fuzzer is the mutator. In the context of fuzzing SMT solvers, a mutator takes
a well-formed SMT formula I and a grammatical construct δ as input, and
outputs a mutated well-formed SMT formula I ′ that is like I, but with a suitable
construct (say, γ) replaced by δ. The construct γ in I could be selected using some
user-defined policy or chosen uniform-at-random over all possible grammatical
constructs in I. In order to be grammar-preserving, the mutator has to choose γ
such that no typing and arity constraints are violated in the resultant formula I ′.
The grammatical construct δ, one of the inputs to the mutator, may be chosen
at random or selected using an RL agent. We describe this process in greater
detail in the next subsection.
On the selection of a grammatical construct, a grammatical construct of the
same type (predicate, operator, or rounding mode, etc.) will uniformly at random
4 We use the terms instance and input interchangeably through this paper.
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be selected. If the replacement involves an arity change, the rightmost subtrees
will be dropped on a decrease in arity, or new subtrees will be generated on an
increase in arity.
For illustrative purposes, we provide an example mutation here. Consider a
maximum depth of two, fixed set of free FP variables (x0, x1), limited rounding
mode set of {RNE}, and an asserted equation:
(fp.eq (fp.add RNE x0 x1)(fp.sub RNE x0 x1)).
If the agent elects to insert fp.abs there are two possible results:
(fp.eq (fp.abs x0)(fp.sub RNE x0 x1))
(fp.eq (fp.add RNE x0 x1)(fp.abs x0)).
For further analysis, consider the additional asserted equation:
(fp.eq (fp.abs x0)(fp.abs x1)),
if the agent elects to insert fp.add, then there are four5 possible outputs:
(fp.eq (fp.add RNE x0 x0)(fp.abs x1))
(fp.eq (fp.add RNE x0 x1)(fp.abs x1))
(fp.eq (fp.abs x0)(fp.add RNE x1 x0))
(fp.eq (fp.abs x0)(fp.add RNE x1 x1))
In these examples, the reason why the possible outputs may seem limited is due
to type and arity preservation rules described above.
As described below, the fuzzer would select one of the mutations in the above
example in a manner that maximizes the overall calculated reward (e.g., the
fuzzing objective such that the performance difference between a solver-under-
test and a reference solver is maximized).
3.3 RL Agent and Reward-driven Feedback Loop in BanditFuzz
As shown in Figure 1, another important component of BanditFuzz is an RL
agent (based on Thompson sampling) that receives rewards and outputs a ranked
list of grammatical constructs (actions). The fuzzer maintains a policy and se-
lects actions from it (“pulling an arm” in the MAB context), and appropriately
modifies the current input I to generate a novel input I ′. The rewards are com-
puted by the Output Analyzer, that takes as input the outputs and runtimes
produced by the solver-under-test S and computes scores and rewards appropri-
ately. These are fed to the RL agent; the RL agent tracks the history of rewards
it obtained for every grammatical construct and refines its ranking over several
5 This is assuming only the RNE rounding mode is allowed, otherwise each of the below
expressions could have any valid rounding mode resulting in 20 possible outputs.
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Algorithm 1 BanditFuzz’s Performance Fuzzing Feedback Loop. Also refer to
BanditFuzz architecture in Figure 1.
1: procedure BanditFuzz(G)
2: Instance I ← a randomly-generated instance over G . Fuzzer
3: Run target solver T and reference solver R on I
4: Compute PerfScore(I) . OutputAnalyzer
5: θ = 2· Solver timeout
6: while fuzzing time limit not reached or PerfScore(I) < θ do
7: construct← RL AGENT picks a grammatical construct . RL Agent
8: I ′ ← Mutate I with construct . Fuzzer
9: Run each solver s ∈ P on I
10: if PerfScore(I ′, P ) > PerfScore(I, P ) then . OutputAnalyzer
11: Provide reward to RL AGENT for construct
12: I ← I ′
13: else
14: Provide no reward to AGENT for construct
15: end if
16: end while
17: return I and the ranking of constructs from RL AGENT
18: end procedure
iterations of BanditFuzz’s feedback loop. We deploy two differing fuzzing feed-
back loops (see Algorithm 1 and 2). In the following subsections, we discuss them
in detail.
Computing Rewards for Performance Fuzzing: We describe Bandit-
Fuzz’s reward computation for performance fuzzing in detail here, and display
the pseudo code for it in Algorithm 1 (see also the architecture in Figure 1 to
get a higher-level view of the algorithm). BanditFuzz works as follows in the
performance fuzzing mode. Initially, the fuzzer generates a well-formed input I
(sampled uniform-at-random). BanditFuzz then executes both the target solver
T and reference solver R on I, and records their respective runtime (it is as-
sumed that both solvers may produce the correct answer with respect to input
I or timeout). BanditFuzz’s OutputAnalyzer module then computes a score,
PerfScore, defined as
PerfScore(I) := runtime(I, T )− runtime(I,R)
where the quantity runtime(I, T ) refers to the runtime of the target solver
T on I, and runtime(I,R) the runtime of the reference solver R on I. If the
target solver reaches the timeout, we set runtime(I, T ) to be 2 ∗ timeout—PAR-
2 scoring in the SMT competition. In the same iteration, BanditFuzz mutates
the input I to I ′ and computes the quantity PerfScore(I’). Recall that we refer
to the mutation inserted into I to obtain I ′ as γ.
The OutputAnalyzer then computes the rewards as follows. It takes as input
I, I ′, quantities PerfScore(I), and PerfScore(I’), and if the quantity PerfScore(I’)
is better than PerfScore(I) (i.e., the target solver is slower than the reference
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Algorithm 2 BanditFuzz’s Bug Localization Feedback Loop. Also refer to Ban-
ditFuzz architecture in Figure 1.
1: procedure BanditFuzzBug(S,G)
2: D ← ∅
3: while fuzzing time limit not reached do
4: I ← a randomly generated input over G
5: if I is inconsistent then
6: D ← D ∪ {I}
7: Continue Loop
8: else
9: construct← Have AGENT select a grammatical construct (action).
10: I ′ ← Mutate I with construct
11: if I ′ is inconsistent then
12: Provide reward to AGENT for construct
13: else
14: Provide no reward to AGENT for construct




19: return D,Ranking of Constructs from RL AGENT
20: end procedure
solver on I ′ relative to their performance on I), the mutations γ gets a positive
reward, else it gets a negative reward. Recall that we want to reward those con-
structs which make the target solver slower than the reference one. The reward
for all other grammatical constructs remain unchanged.
The rewards thus computed are fed into the RL agent. The bandit then
updates the rank of the grammatical constructs. The Thompson sampling bandit
analyzes historically the positive and negative rewards for each grammatical
construct and computes the α and β parameters. The highest ranked construct
γ is fed into the fuzzer for the subsequent iteration. This process continues until
the fuzzing resource limit has been reached.
Computing Rewards for Fuzzing for Bug Localization: Algorithm 2
describes BanditFuzz’s bug-finding mode. We elaborate on its reward compu-
tation procedure here. Just like in its performance fuzzing mode, BanditFuzz
initially generates a well-formed input I and executes both the target and ref-
erence solvers on I. (For simplicity, assume that the reference solver produces
the correct answer on I.) If the answers given by T and R differ, it means that
there is an error in T . When a bug-revealing input I ′ is identified, BanditFuzz’s
OutputAnalyzer assigns a reward to the construct γ that differentiates I ′ from I.
The RL agent uses Thompson sampling to update the ranks of the grammatical
constructs in I based on the rewards thus obtained.
At a high level, BanditFuzz collects the bug-revealing inputs (to return them
to the user upon completion), and learns which language features are common
among the set. This learning helps us produce more inconsistency revealing
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Target Solver BanditFuzz Random Mutational Evolutionary % Improvement
Colibri 499061.5 499544.2 499442.2 499295.1 -0.10 %
CVC4 144568.9 68714.2 125273.0 38972.7 15.40 %
MathSAT5 36654.5 12024.9 31615.4 8208.0 15.94 %
Z3 467590.0 239774.3 256973.1 251108.2 81.96 %
Table 1. PAR-2 Score Margins of the returned inputs for considered fuzzing algorithms
for FP SMT performance fuzzing
Target Solver BanditFuzz Random Mutational Genetic Improvement
CVC4 45629.8 30815.4 30815.4 31619.4 44.15%
Z3STR3 499988.6 499986.7 499987.2 499986.8 0.00%
Z3SEQ 499883.4 409111.0 433416.5 445097.427 12.31%
Table 2. PAR-2 Score Margins of the returned inputs for considered fuzzing algorithms
for string SMT performance fuzzing
inputs, and explain to the solver developer which language features are likely
to be responsible for the bugs. The explanation is the ranked list described
earlier.
4 Empirical Evaluation: Fuzzing for Performance
In this section, we present an evaluation of BanditFuzz for performance fuzzing.
All experiments were performed on the SHARCNET computing service [3]: a
CentOS V7 cluster of Intel Xeon Processor E5-2683 running at 2.10 GHz. We
limited each solver to 8GB of memory without parallelization, and otherwise ran
each with default settings.
4.1 Experimental Setup
Baselines: We compare BanditFuzz with three different widely-used approaches:
random, mutation, and evolutionary fuzzing. We describe the three approaches
below. We do not compare against several existing fuzzing systems, such as AFL
and SkyFire [48, 46], because it is difficult to apply them to large and sophisti-
cated grammars, such as those used by SMT solvers. There is a large literature
on fuzzing specific pieces of software [27], in addition to SMT Solvers [9, 14, 13].
1. Random Fuzzing – Random fuzzers are programs that sample inputs from
the grammar of the program-under-test (we only consider model-based ran-
dom fuzzers here). Random fuzzing is a simple yet powerful approach to
software fuzzing. We use StringFuzz as our random fuzzer for strings and
extend a version of it to FP as described in Section 3.2.
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Fig. 2. Cactus Plot for targeting the Z3 FP Solver against reference solvers CVC4,
Colibri, and MathSAT.
2. Mutational Fuzzing – A mutation fuzzer typically mutates or modifies a
database of input seeds in order to generate new inputs to test a program.
Mutation fuzzing has had a tremendous impact, most notably in the context
of model-less program domains [48, 17, 30, 27]. We use StringFuzz transform-
ers as our mutational fuzzer with grammatical constructs selected uniformly
at random. We lift StringFuzz transformer’s to FP as described in Section 3.2
.
3. Evolutionary Fuzzing – Evolutionary fuzzing algorithms maintain a popu-
lation of inputs. Every generation, only the fittest members of the population
survive, and new members are created through random generation, breeding,
and mutation. [34, 39]. We implement evolutionary fuzzing as follows:
1 Initialize: Random Fuzzing is deployed for ten queries to initialize the
population.
2 In a loop until global timeout:
(a) Remove all inputs from the population except the four highest scor-
ing inputs.
(b) Compute a new population composed of
i. mutated inputs for each of the surviving inputs, and
ii. fresh randomly generated inputs.
(c) Solve all new inputs.
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Fig. 3. Cactus Plot for targeting the Z3Seq string solver against reference solvers CVC4
and Z3str3.
(d) If a mutated input improves on its derived input, discard its derived
input.
We run each of the baseline fuzzing algorithms and BanditFuzz on a target
solver (e.g., Z3’s FP procedure) and a set of reference solvers (e.g., CVC4, Colibri,
MathSAT) for 24 hours with the aim of constructing a inputs that maximize the
difference between the runtime of the target solver and the reference solvers.
We repeat this process for each fuzzing algorithm 100 times. We then take and
compare the highest-scoring instance for each solver for each fuzzing algorithm.
Quantitative Evaluation: For each solver/input pair, we record the CPU
time (i.e., the process time for the solver run on the fuzzer-generated input). To
evaluate a solver over a set of inputs, we use PAR-2 scores. PAR-2 is defined
as the sum of all successful runtimes, with unsolved inputs labeled as twice
the timeout. As we are fuzzing for performance with respect to a target solver,
we evaluate the returned test suite of a fuzzing algorithm based on the PAR-2
margin between the PAR-2 of the target solver and the input wise maximum
across all of the reference solvers.
For example, consider a target solver S1 against a set of reference solvers
S2, S3, over a benchmark suite of three inputs. Let the runtimes for the solver S1
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on the three inputs be 1000.0, timeout, 100.0, that of solver S2 be 50.0, 30.0, 10.0,
and that of solver S3 be 100.0, 1000.0, 1.0, respectively. With our timeout of 2500
seconds, S1 would have a PAR-2 of 6100, S2 a score of 90, and S3 a score of 1101.
We define the PAR-2 margin by summing the difference between the maximum
of S2, S3 from that of solver S1 on each of the inputs, which in this example
results in a (1000− 100) + (5000− 1000) + (100− 10) = 4990 PAR-2 margin.
We define the notion of perfect PAR-2 margin over a set of n inputs to be
n∗2∗timeout, which in the above example with 3 inputs and a timeout of 2500 is
15,000 (3 ∗ 2 ∗ 2500). Note that the fuzzing algorithm that maximizes the PAR-2
margin over all fuzzed inputs for a given target solver is deemed the best fuzzer
for that target solver. The fuzzer that is best, as measured by PAR-2 margin,
among all fuzzers across all target solvers is considered the best fuzzer overall.
Visualization: As discussed below, the performance results of the solvers on
the fuzzed inputs generated by the baseline fuzzers and BanditFuzz are visualized
using cactus plots. A cactus plot demonstrates a solvers performance over a set of
benchmarks, with the X-axis denoting the total number of solved inputs and the
Y-axis denoting the solver timeout in seconds. A point (X, Y) on a cactus plot
can be interpreted as the solver can solve X of the inputs from the benchmark
set with each input solved within Y seconds. In our setting, cactus plots can
be used to visualize the the performance separation from the target solver and
reference solvers.
4.2 Performance Fuzzing Results for FP SMT Solvers
In our performance fuzzing evaluation of BanditFuzz, we consider the following
state-of-the-art FP SMT solvers: Z3 v4.8.0 - a multi-theory open source SMT
solver [20], MathSAT5 v5.5.3. a multi theory SMT solver [18], CVC4 v1.7 -
a multi theory open source SMT Solver [4], and Colibri v2070 - A proprietary
CP Solver with specialty in FP SMT [10, 29].
Table 1 presents the margins of the PAR-2 scores between the target solver
and the maximum of the reference solvers across the returned inputs for each
fuzzing algorithm. BanditFuzz shows a notable improvement on fuzzing baselines
except for when Colibri is selected as the target solver. In the case of Colibri
being the target solver, all baselines observe PAR-2 margins near the maximum
value of 500,000, leaving no room for BanditFuzz to improve. Having such a high
margin indicates each run of a fuzzer resulted in an input where Colibri timed
out, yet all other considered solvers solved it almost immediately.
Figure 2 presents the cactus plot for the experiments when Z3 was the target
solver. Also, we can obtain a ranking of grammatical constructs by extrapolat-
ing the α, β values from the learned model and sampling its beta distribution to
approximate the expected value of reward for the grammatical construct’s corre-
sponding action. The top three for each target solver are: Colibri – fp.neg, fp.abs,
fp.isNegative, CVC4 – fp.sqrt, fp.gt, fp.geq, MathSAT5 – fp.isNaN, RNE, fp.mul,
Z3 – fp.roundToIntegral, fp.div, fp.isNormal. This indicates that, e.g., CVC4’s
reasoning on fp.sqrt could be improved by studying Z3’s implementation.
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4.3 Performance Fuzzing – String SMT Solvers
In our performance fuzzing evaluation of BanditFuzz, we consider the following
state-of-the-art string SMT solvers: Z3str3 v4.8.0 [6], Z3seq v 4.8.0 [20], and
CVC4 v1.7 [4]. We fuzz the string solvers for relative performance issues, with
each considered as a target solver. Identically to the above FP experiments, each
run of a fuzzer is repeated 100 times to generate 100 different inputs.
Table 2 presents the margins of the PAR-2 scores between the target solver
and the maximum of the remaining solvers across the returned inputs for each
fuzzing algorithm. BanditFuzz shows a substantial improvement on fuzzing base-
lines except for when Z3str3 is selected as the target solver. However, in this
scenario the PAR-2 margins are near the maximum value of 500000, across all
fuzzing algorithms. This implies a nearly maximum input resulting in Z3str3
timing out while CVC4 and Z3SEQ solve the input nearly instantly.
As in the previous Section 4.2, we can extrapolate the grammatical constructs
that were most likely to cause a performance slowdown. The top three for each
target solver are as follows: CVC4 – re.range, str.contains, str.to int, Z3Seq –
re.in regex, str.prefixOf, str.length, Z3str3 – str.contains, str.suffixOf, str.concat.
Further, Figure 3 presents the cactus plot for the experiments when Z3seq was
the target solver. The cactus plot provides a visualization of the fuzzing objec-
tive, maximizing the performance margins between Z3seq and the other solvers
collectively. The line for BanditFuzz Z3seq is not rendered on the plot as none
of the returned inputs were solved by Z3seq. Cactus plots for the target solvers
of Z3str3 and CVC4 can be found on the anonymized BanditFuzz webpage.6
5 Empirical Evaluation: Fuzzing for Bug Localization
In this section, we present an evaluation of BanditFuzz for finding bugs in SMT
Solvers. Specifically, we ask, how many inputs can we discover that are inconsis-
tent (See Section 3.3) across solvers? In the previous section, the fuzzing oracle
was wall-clock time. A fuzzing oracle for bugs is less obvious. We use the solver
output inconsistency as a fuzzing oracle. More details are in Section 3.3.
5.1 Experimental Setup
Baselines: We refer to the baselines from Section 4 for bug fuzzing. Random
fuzzing is left unmodified with the exception of the fuzzing objective. Evolution-
ary fuzzing is dropped due to the binary nature of fitness. Mutation Fuzzing
is modified to follow the structure of Algorithm 2 with random grammatical
construct selection.
Visualization and Quantitative Evaluation: The aim of this particular
fuzzing experiment is to generate as many syntactically unique inputs that trig-
ger a bug while minimizing net time [27]. Anything further begins to leave the
6 https://sites.google.com/view/banditfuzz
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Fig. 4. Plots of bugs over inputs generated and solved for all considered fuzzing algo-
rithms for the FP SMT solvers (left) and string SMT solvers(right).
scope of blackbox fuzzing requiring grey/whitebox fuzzing. We visualize perfor-
mance by showing bugs over the total number of inputs generated and solved.
We evaluate performance based on the total number of syntactically unique bugs
upon termination.7
We generate inputs with three to five assertions and with depth of two to four.
We run each solver with a 60 second timeout. We run each fuzzing algorithm
for 20,000 input queries over the set of solvers S. The generator constraints are
intentionally set to create short instances. The rationale for this is to create
instances that are short to both aid the debugging process and help limit the
runtime of the solver.
5.2 Bug Fuzzing – FP SMT Solvers
In our bug fuzzing evaluation of BanditFuzz we consider the same set of FP
solvers used in Section 4.2. Figure 4 (left) presents the bug inputs generated and
solved for each considered fuzzing algorithm. Unlike performance fuzzing where
only the final inputs were presented, we are able to visualize the learning process
of the bandit as it converges to an action selection policy. In the beginning,
BanditFuzz is in a purely exploration phase of the learning process, behaving
very similarly to random mutational fuzzing. However, we observe that at around
7500 queries the bandit begins to separate itself, isolating the keywords that are
most likely to induce a bug.
Similarly as before in Section 4, we can extrapolate from the learned model
which grammatical constructs are most likely to reveal an inconsistent input
over the set of solvers. The top 3 such are RNE, fp.eq, and fp.isNegative.
7 We do note that syntactically unique inputs don’t necessarily correspond to distinct
errors in a program-under-test. While we do not do so here, code coverage is another
metric by which fuzzers can be compared.
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5.3 Bug Fuzzing – String SMT Solvers
In our bug fuzzing evaluation of BanditFuzz, we consider a different set of string
solvers.
1. Z3STR3 v4.8.6 – The release build of the Z3 Solver used in Section 4
2. Z3STR3-DEBUG v4.8.6 – The debug build of the above solver.
These two solvers are very similar, resulting in a very challenging fuzzing
problem. This experiment is included to test the limits of BanditFuzz.
Figure 4 (right) presents the bugs inputs generated and solved for each con-
sidered fuzzing algorithm. Unlike the FP experiment, BanditFuzz took several
additional iterations to latch on to the precise subset of the action space to in-
duce bugs more frequently than in the FP setting. However, well before 15,000
iterations, BanditFuzz surpasses all considered baselines. We suspect this slow-
down to be cause by the increased difficulty of the problem, while in the FP
setting, the solvers are significantly more diverse.
Once again, we can extrapolate from the learned model which grammatical
constructs were most likely to cause an inconsistent answer amongst Z3STR3
and Z3STR3-DEBUG. The top three grammatical constructs were: str.in re,
str.substr, and str.++.
6 Related Work
SMT Benchmarks and SMT Fuzzing: The SMT-LIB community has col-
lected a large set of benchmarks coming from a wide variety of domains to test
and evaluate their solvers. Unfortuantely, these benchamrks are static and ex-
pensive to create. BanditFuzz can be used to cheaply and automatically add
to these benchmark suites. Fuzzing is a dominant approach for testing software
systems, and the literature is too vast for a complete review here. We refer the
reader to Takanen et al. [45] and Sutton [41] for a detailed overview of fuzzing. In
the context of SMT solvers, fuzzers exist for specific theories such as strings [9]
and bit-vectors [14]. However, we are not aware of any fuzzer for FP SMT solvers.
Further, we are not aware of any fuzzers, other than BanditFuzz, that can be
used to isolate or localize grammatical constructs that are the root causes of
bugs or performance issues.
Fuzzing and Machine Learning: Existing fuzzers have used machine learning
in some capacity. Bottinger et al. [11] introduce a deep Q learning algorithm for
fuzzing model-free inputs. This approach would not scale to either FP SMT nor
string SMT theories, given the complexity of their grammars. Such a tool would
need to first learn the grammar to penetrate the parsers. To this end, Godefroid
et al. [21] uses neural networks to learn an input grammar over complicated do-
mains such as PDF and then use the learned grammar for model-guided fuzzing.
It is not clear to us whether these methods can deal with the complex grammars
of SMT solvers. To the best of our knowledge, BanditFuzz is the first fuzzer
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to use RL to implement model-based mutation operators that can be used to
isolate the root causes of errors or performance issues in programs-under-test.
More specifically, bandit algorithms have been used in various aspects as
fuzzing, but never to implement a mutation, and instead as wrappers to exist-
ing fuzzers. Karamcheti et al. [24] trained bandit algorithms to select model-less
bitwise mutation operators from an array of fixed operators for greybox fuzzing.
Woo et al. [47] and Patil et al. [33] used bandit algorithms to select configu-
rations of global hyper-parameters of fuzzing software. Rebert et al. [35] used
bandit algorithms to select from a list of valid inputs seeds to apply a model-less
mutation procedure on. Our work differs from these listed methods, as we learn
a model-based mutation operator implemented by an RL agent. Appelt et al. [1]
combine blackbox testing with machine learning to direct fuzzing. To the best
of our knowledge, our work is the first to use reinforcement learning or bandit
algorithms to learn and implement a mutation operator within a grammar-based
or random or evolutionary fuzzing algorithm.
Delta Debugging: BanditFuzz has a close relationship with delta debugging
but solves a different problem. In delta debugging, a bug-revealing input E is
given, and the task of a delta-debugger is to minimize E to get E′, by choosing
which part of that input to keep (and which one to omit), while ensuring that
E′ exposes the same error in the program-under-test as E [32, 31, 2, 49]. Bandit-
Fuzz, on the other hand, generates and examines a set of—bug or performance
revealing—inputs by leveraging reinforcement learning. The goal of BanditFuzz
is to discover patterns over the entire generated set. Specifically, BanditFuzz
finds and ranks the language features that are the root cause of errors in the
program-under-test. Furthermore, unlike delta-debugging, BanditFuzz generates
inputs that reveal relative performance differences on pairs of programs.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we presented BanditFuzz, a fuzzer for FP and string SMT solvers
that automatically isolates and ranks those grammatical constructs in an input
that are the most likely cause of an error or relative performance issue. Bandit-
Fuzz is the first fuzzer for FP SMT solvers that we are aware of, and the first
fuzzer to use reinforcement learning, specifically MAB, to fuzz SMT solvers. We
compared BanditFuzz against a baseline of random, and evolutionary fuzzing
techniques, and found that it outperforms existing approaches. More specifi-
cally, our fuzzer gave an 31% improvement in performance fuzzing and up to an
81% improvement in bug fuzzing. In our experiments, we were able to learn a
policy that describes how to maximize the difference between solver runtimes.
In the future, we plan to extend BanditFuzz to other SMT decision procedures
as well non SMT settings.
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